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BOOK REVIEW 
UNMASKING FEDERALISM 
Carl Tobiast 
NARRO\NlNG THE NATION'S PO\NER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH 
THE STATES. By john 1~ Noonan, Jr. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002. Pp. 203. $34.95. 
If you were a woman attending a state college and you were raped by several 
members of the football team, you would be more than outraged to discover 
that, when state authorities did nothing to punish the rapists, federal law 
was helpless to make up for their deficiency. Yet [this] and similar results 
have been reached in the last jive years because of judgments of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 1 
Judge John Noonan has astutely chronicled law and society over a 
half century. He was a professor for twenty-five years, authoring such 
classics as Persons and Masks of the Law, 2 and has rendered distin-
guished service since 1985 on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.3 Thus, the publication of Narrowing the Nation's 
Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States ("Narrowing') 4 would be 
important, even if the monograph were only a venerated scholar's re-
flections on his long, rich experience. This book, however, is a pro-
vocative critique that meticulously and incisively exposes the Court's 
new federalism and separation of powers jurisprudence as radical de-
partures from settled understandings, departures that lack constitu-
tional support. Noonan has issued a powerful, timely indictment of 
Supreme Court decisionmaking, which is striking because his position 
in the judicial hierarchy requires a keen understanding of those cases 
and because some observers may have thought him sympathetic to the 
Justices' dramatic new path. These ideas mean that Narrowing war-
t Beckley Singleton Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas; Visiting Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to 
thank Chris Bryant, Lynne Henderson, Margaret Sanner, and Rod Smith for valuable 
ideas; Genny Schloss for processing this piece; and Beckley Singleton and Jim Rogers for 
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
I Joi-INT. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S PowER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES 
WITH THE STATES 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter NARROWING]. 
2 Jo1m T. NooNAN,.JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw (1976). 
3 780 F.2d XXlll n. l 0 (l 986). 
4 NARROWING, supra note l. 
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rants analysis. This Review first descriptively examines the volume and 
finds that Noonan illuminates comprehension of this recent, novel 
turn in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Review then explores the 
work's numerous beneficial features. It concludes with several recom-
mendations for future work in this area. 
I. 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Noonan initially traces a conundrum experienced by the Ameri-
can Republic since the Founding: the proper allocation of authority 
between the states and the national government as well as among the 
federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches.I'; The Prologue 
considers how the Supreme Court has enunciated doctrines that pro-
tect the sovereignty of the fifty states. 6 The Justices have scrutinized 
Congress's legislative power, especially under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and have demanded "congruence and proportionality between" 
the evil at issue and any legislative treatment. 7 They have also man-
dated that lawmakers develop a record that historically demonstrates 
"widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights."8 
Those requirements shift power from Congress toward both the states 
and the federal judiciary.9 
The opinions Noonan assesses received facilitation when the 
Court decided it had authority for the Constitution's definitive inter-
pretation.10 The Justices invoke no express constitutional language 
and ridicule "ahistorical literalism,"11 which Noonan describes as "a 
5 See id. at 1-5. For several histories of the protracted, tortured debate over the states 
as sovereigns, see JoHN E. NOWAK & RoNALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 3, 4 
(6th ed. 2000); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5, 6 (3d ed. 
2000). 
6 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 1-5. 
7 Id. at 5 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
8 Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). See generally A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy 
J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress. The Supreme Court's New "On 17ie Record" Constitutional 
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 369-73 (2001) (describing the Court's 
shift towards lack of deference to Congress); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, 
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 107-09, 111-19 (2001) (comparing the 
Court's pre-1995 deference to Congress with its less deferential stance following Boerne). 
9 See NARROWING, su.pra note 1, at 5. See generally David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things 
Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sur. CT. 
REv. 31, 77 (arguing that "Congress should be permitted to go further than the Court in its 
interpretation of' the Constitution). 
lO See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803); NARROWING, sufJra note 1, at 
7-8. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xii-xvii 
(1941) (describing the Court's assertion ofjudicial supremacy in constitutional interpreta-
tion); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, The SufJreme Court: 2000 Term, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2001) (describing and criticizing the expansion of judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation). 
11 NARROWINC, suf1ra note 1, at 9 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)). 
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more adventurous reading of the [C]onstitution." 12 Noonan findsju-
dicial "activism" an illusory analytical tool 13 and prefers logic, excoriat-
ing the "contradiction in terms" wrought by the sovereign immunity 
rule as "intolerable in any rational discourse." 14 He thus posits the 
modest goal of articulating a principle unbroken by multiple excep-
tions yet believes even worse a principle with no rationale for its crea-
tion or extension, is an apt description of the recent jurisprudence. 15 
As a guiding principle, Noonan employs the purposes the people 
voiced in the Constitution's Preamble: "to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility [ ] and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty." 16 Noonan asks whether the case results honor these 
grand objectives by posing several rhetorical questions. For example, 
"[d]o decisions that return the country to a pre-Civil War understand-
ing of the nation establish a more perfect union?" 17 The answers 
show that the opinions are grounded in doctrinal constructs-"state 
sovereign immunity, congruence and proportionality of legislation, 
and a record of evils to be eradicated"18-without basis in the Consti-
tution. Thus, removal of these obfuscatory doctrinal constructs clari-
fies the rulings' failure to serve the Constitution's purposes. 19 
Noonan criticizes the constitutional balance struck as suggesting that 
the fifty states count more than the millions of individuals potentially 
affected by the opinions.20 The effort to enlarge states' power simulta-
neously increases judicial authority vis-a-vis Congress and the Presi-
dent because the Court exercises discretion to ascertain whether 
immunity exists, whether an enactment is congruent or proportion-
ate, and whether a legislative record suffices.21 
The writer analogizes the present situation to other historical mo-
ments when similar decisions-decisions which replaced legislatures' 
judgments with those of courts and which were subsequently discred-
ited because they lacked constitutional support-negatively affected 
12 Id.; see infra notes 40-47, 49-60 and accompanying text (supplying additional vocif-
erous criticism of the Court by Noonan). 
13 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 10. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. 
16 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; NARROWING, supra note 1, at 11. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE (1998) (exploring American constitutional understanding and its federal-
ism implications). 
17 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12; see infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
18 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 12-13. 
21 See id. at 13; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec-
tion 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (arguing against the Court's "congruence and 
proportionality" test); supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (reiterating the Court's 
lack of deference to Congress and assertion of supremacy in interpreting the 
Constitution). 
1836 CORN"tLL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1833 
the country.22 For example, Dred Scott v. Sandford 2?. led to the Civil 
War, and Lochner v. New York 24 adversely affected working conditions 
over several decades. 25 
Noonan finds that City of Boerne v. Flores26 is a sharp break, and 
Chapter One tells its story in light of America's devotion to religious 
liberty and the power that the Fourteenth Amendment granted Con-
gress.27 The greatest danger in Boerne is how the Justices anoint them-
selves the paramount expositors of the Constitution by creating, for 
use against future Congresses, two novel weapons: close judicial in-
spection of the legislative record for persuasive evidence of the evil at 
issue and inspection for a congruent or proportionate response.28 
The second and third chapters use a dialogic technique, albeit 
with mixed effects, to show how the Court, as the devotee of state 
dignity and "history's hitchhiker," embraces sovereign immunity in 
ways that are overdrawn, lack historical support, and defy consistent 
application.w Chapters Four and Five assess major cases that illustrate 
the "unhappy" results when the Justices apply novel legislative criteria 
to sovereign immunity in the context of an old intellectual property 
statute~m and a newer measure that accorded elderly and disabled in-
dividuals equality.?. 1 The sixth chapter examines the hostile judicial 
reaction to legislative efforts that provided women with equal protec-
tion, a reaction premised on state autonomy and individual liberty. 82 
22 S1:e NARROWING, supra note 1, at 13. See generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 5, at§§ 7-5 to -6, 
at 1318-22, § 8-1, at 1332-34, §§ 8-2 to -9, at 1343-74 (describing the post-Lochner evolu-
tion of substantive due process and the problems that arose). 
2ll 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
24 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
25 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 13. 
26 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
27 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 15-40;jOHN T. NooNAN,jR., THE LusTRE or OuR 
COUNTRY: TI-IE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE or RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Institutions and lnteipretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153 (1997). 
28 See NARROWINt:, supra note I, at 40. 
29 See id. at 41-85. 
llO See id. at 86-10 I; Fla. P1·epaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999). See generally B1)'ant & Simeone, sufJra note 8, at 348-52 (discussing 
fl01ida Prejmid and comparing it with Boerne); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The 
CaseoJFederalRegulation oflntellectualProfJerty, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1331, 1331 (2001) (examin-
ing, in the face of sovereign immunity, "the options open to Congress ... [for] providing 
... means to deter and redress violations by states of federal intellectual property rights"). 
lll See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); NARROWING, sufmi 
note 1, at 102-19. See generally Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 8, at 117-19, 160 (discussing 
triumph of legislative record review in Congress's age- and disability-related legislation); 
Ruth Colker &James]. Bn.1dney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 86, 141-43 (2001) 
(discussing legislative and federalism implications of Garrell). 
?.2 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 120-37 (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000), holding that Congress lacked the authority under either the Commerce 
Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided 
federal civil remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence). See generally Kramer, supra 
2003] UNMAKING FEDERALISM 1837 
Noonan admits the difficulty of calibrating perfect balances between 
the states and the national government and among its co-equal 
branches. However, his experience as a citizen immersed in law for 
fifty years and as a reader of history prompts his conclusion that "[t]he 
middle ground has ... moved, with unsettling consequences," and the 
country's motto, e pluribus unum, must also be its polestar.33 
Chapter Seven proposes meaningful resolution, given the current 
risk to democratic government, a risk that has upset vital balances in 
organic national life, despite the judiciary's characterization as the 
least dangerous branch.34 Noonan canvasses a broad spectrum of 
congressional responses. However, he deems a few, such as impeach-
ment, too "heavy;" some, namely court funding, petty; and others, in-
cluding Justices' confirmation, awkward.35 Noonan finds legislation 
most "readily available"36 and surveys powers the Court has yet to re-
strict and ideas that could satisfy its constitutional standards, but he is 
not sanguine about these measures' efficacy.37 His obligatory allusion 
to amending the Constitution recognizes the solution as difficult and 
rare. 38 
Noonan asserts that "[t]he sovereign remedy for ills in a democ-
racy is exploration and exposition," assisting those with authority in 
note 10, at 161-63 (criticizing Morrison as "constitutional history in a funhouse mirror"); 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Seigel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation 
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441 (2000) (discussing Morrison's implications); 
Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE LJ. 619 
(2001) (criticizing "categorical federalism" as oversimplified). 
33 NARROWING, sujJra note 1, at 14. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001) (discussing federalism theory and jurisprudence). 
34 See NARROWING, sujmL note 1, at 138-56; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton) ("[I]n a government in which [the departments of power] are separated from 
each other, the judicial)', from the nature of iL~ functions, will always be the least danger-
ous to the political rights of the constitution .... "). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: T11E SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (discuss-
ing the Court's power and influence on the counll)'). 
35 See NARROWING, sujmL note l, at 140-41; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (refer-
ring to Congress's power" [ t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); art. 11, 
§ 2, cl. 2 (referring to the president's power to appoint 'judges of the supreme Court"); 
art. 11, § 4 (stating that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"). See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE 
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING Up THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS ( 1994) (criticizing 
the politicization of the confirmation process); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 
(1999) (discussing President Clinton's impeachment and surrounding events). 
3fi NARROWING, supra note ] ' at 141. 
37 Id. at 141-43; see Colker & Brudney, supra note 31, at 136; Meltzer, supra note 30 
and accompanying text. 
38 NARROWING, suj1ra rfote 1, at 143; see U.S. CoNsT. art. V; see also A. Christopher 
Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-slavery and "Irrevocable" 171irteenth Amendment, 26 HARv.J.L. & 
Pus. Po1;v 501 (2003) (examining the historical and contemporaI)' significance ot~ exclu-
sivity of, and limitations on the Article V amendment power of the Constitution). 
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exercising good sense to resolve problems. '.1v The author summarizes 
his critique, emphasizing the Justices' abstractions and lack of con-
cern for facts and for all the people affected by sovereign immunity.40 
He reiterates that the Court's approach to legislation is a novel, de-
structive creation that invades the prerogatives of Congress.41 Noo-
nan discredits congruence and proportionality for affording no real 
measure, even as they prompt invention of the "legislative record" no-
tion that similarly requires subjective judgment.42 The writer chastises 
the Justices for acting as if they alone have competence, positing that 
only the people are supreme in the American form of government. 4:i 
Noonan analyzes the states' role in the Constitution, which does 
not mention sovereign immunity,44 while reviewing and exposing as 
deficient arguments for sovereign immunity derived from structure, 
solvency, tort, and dignity.4 '' Immunity also resists felicitous applica-
tion because it cannot be confined, equitably or consistently used, or 
reconciled with the federal system.46 Finding no support in the Con-
stitution, the "nature of things," or statutes, the author concludes that 
states can accord people unfair treatment only because the Court 
"has, by its own will, moved the middle ground and narrowed the na-
tion's power."47 
:ID NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143; see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, judicial 
Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalisrn Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critiqw?, 111 YALE 
LJ. 1707 (2002). 
40 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143-45; see also infra notes 58-61 and accompany-
ing text. 
41 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 145-48; sufml notes 7-9, 26-32 and accompanying 
text. 
42 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 145-48; supra notes 7-9, 26-32 and accompanying 
text. 
4:1 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 149-50. See generally AcK~:RMAN, sufna note 16 
(agreeing that only the American people are supreme and urging them to become in-
formed and involved in their government). 
44 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 150-53. See g1merally NAGEL, su/rm note 33 (discuss-
ing the social and legal history as well as implementation of federalism). 
41> See NARROWING, su/Jra note 1, at 153-54; see also O.W. Holmes, Jr., 111e Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 ( 1897) ("l tis revolting to have no better reason for a rule of 
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."). See generally Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Against Sovereign lmrnunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (2001) (arguing that sovereign 
immunity is an unconstitutional anachronism). 
46 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 154-56. See generally Caminker, su/na note 21 (ar-
guing for a "rational relationship" test rather than the existing "congruence and propor-
tionality" test); Meltzer, supra note 30, al 1343-89 (describing alternative courses of 
legislative action in the face of sovereign immunity). 
4 7 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 156. 
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II. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Noonan provides many valuable insights. Most crucial, he illus-
trates the ways in which the new cases have shifted authority's previous 
vertical balance toward the states from the federal government while 
fostering horizontal accretion in the judiciary of power earlier held by 
the legislative and executive branches. Prior scholarship had criti-
cized individual decisions, and even changes in doctrine and emer-
gent patterns,48 but Narrowing is the clearest, fullest rendition thus far. 
The book traces the applicable history, evaluates, and imposes a salu-
tary conceptual structure on integral, specific opinions, identifies dis-
crete doctrinal strands, and trenchantly shows that the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts. 
A related, helpful contribution is the clarity, force and candor 
with which Noonan dissects the cases and finds them contradictory, 
lacking constitutional support, and perhaps unprincipled. Noonan 
sees as exaggerated and misguided the notion of state sovereignty that 
pervades many rulings. 49 He vociferously criticizes the Justices for ex-
panding the Eleventh Amendment language, thus limiting federal ju-
risdiction to resolve some litigation against state governments and 
creating wider immunity that encompasses subsidiary bodies, such as 
college presses. 50 Noonan attacks as "'ahistorical literalism' "51 the 
Court's fidelity to the amendment's words, a fidelity which cannot sus-
tain the inclusion of state court lawsuits within the immunity.52 Noo-
nan apparently believes the revisionist views of Justices who formerly 
espoused adherence to constitutional text and the Framers' original 
intent to be disingenuous, or even hypocritical.53 The author damns 
this method as "audacious" and "a pretense," while he expressly ac-
cuses the Court of securing a rhetorical benefit when it labels state 
48 See, e.g., Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and 
State Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (2001); Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity 
and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000); Bryant & Simeone, supra 
note 8, at 354-89; Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 8, at 117-19, 160; Colker & Brudney, 
sujJra note 31, at 86, 141-43; Kramer, supra note 10, at 161-63; Post & Seigel, supra note 32, 
at 456-509; Resnik, supra note 32, at 626-56. 
49 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 1-14, 138-56. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 3, 86-101, 154-55. 
51 Id. at 9 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999)). 
52 See, e.g., id. at 9-10; supra notes 12, 44, 47 and accompanying text. 
53 NARROWING, supra note I, at 9. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUGTION OF THE LAw (1990) (describing the politicization of 
constitutional law as unfaithful to established doctrine); EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw viii (1994) (comparing various approaches to constitutional interpreta-
tion with "a constitutional state of nature ... under which the written constitution would 
play no role in judicial decisionmaking"); A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAw (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997) (presenting arguments for and ag-<1inst textualism 
in constitutional interpretation). 
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sovereignty "'an eleventh amendment' matter." According to Noo-
nan, the constitutional connection is imaginary.54 Noonan disparages 
the recent, sharp restriction of Congress's power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the Fourteenth Amendment.55 He considers the de-
cision that makes the Justices, not the lawmakers, the arbiters of 
propriety to be an "invention,"56 premised on the amendment's mis-
understanding, which enlarges judicial authority at the expense of the 
legislature.57 
Particularly effective is his criticism of the novel demand that 
Congress support legislative choices with an evidentiary record, rather 
than material that the Court devalues as merely anecdotal.58 Noonan 
recounts the travails of the litigants who actually pursue federalism 
cases and chastises the Justices for ignoring them and millions of 
other persons whom the opinions touch.59 His admonitions are tell-
ing reminders that abstract conceptualizations of harmonious distri-
bution of governmental power can profoundly affect individuals. The 
recent decisions' gravest error is their authorization for states to treat 
many people inequitably.60 This insightful storytelling is thus redo-
lent of Noonan's exploration of the individual in legal history, legal 
philosophy, and legal education in Persons and Masks of the Law.61 
These ideas assume greater force because their advocate is a judi-
cial officer, obligated to follow the precise rulings that he so incisively 
criticizes. Noonan explains that judges and attorneys have an impor-
tant duty to reform and enhance the law, and he astutely wonders 
what change is more necessary than the elucidation of opinions that 
do not implement purposes specified in the Constitution.02 
5 4 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 151-52. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 45 (argu-
ing that sovereign immunity is not a constitutional doctrine and that it should be abolished 
by the Supreme Court). 
55 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 148-50; supra notes 8, 21 and accompanying text. 
56 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 146. 
57 See id. at 6-7, 145-47; supra notes 8-10, 21 and accompanying text. 
58 See, e.g., NARROWING, supra note 1, at 5-6, 147-48. See generally Colker & Brudney, 
supra note 31, at 108-10 (discussing the Court's rejection oflegislation in absence of suffi-
cient legislative record in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)). 
59 See NARROWING, supra note 1, at 12-13, 144-45; supra text accompanying note 8. 
60 See NARROWING, supra note I, at 12, 144-45. 
61 NoONAN, supra note 2. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2073 (1989) (exploring the importance of storytelling in law). 
62 NARROWING, supra note 1, at 143. Noonan's candor perfectly shows the grave im-
port of the Article 111 judiciary's independence. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, UNCER-
TAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 11-75, 129-71, 213-42 (2000); Symposium, 
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999). 
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III. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Despite the numerous perceptive contributions afforded by Nar-
rowing, I can proffer suggestions for future work .. Expanding on some 
issues may facilitate comprehension of the present Court and its feder-
alism jurisprudence. For instance, appreciating the ways in which 
state sovereign immunity disadvantages individuals is certainly valua-
ble, 63 although it would be equally useful to analyze the Court's influ-
ence on power's horizontal distribution given, for example, the Bush 
Administration assertions of authority vis-a-vis Congress.64 It would be 
similarly advantageous to delineate the vertical effects, as national 
power's devolution to the states seems anachronistic, if not danger-
ous, in a time of global crisis engendered by terrorism.65 Detailing 
the horizontal and vertical impacts might concomitantly inform mod-
ern domestic controversies, such as the preferable governmental 
branch and level to address important societal concerns, including 
crime, education, and the environment. 66 This knowledge would as-
sist policymakers as well as the public in determining whether the 
United States benefits fromjudicial power's accretion at the expense 
of the legislative and executive branches or from increasing state au-
thority vis-a-vis the federal govemment.67 
Notwithstanding Noonan's thorough critique and the urgent na-
ture of his messages, they may reach a rather narrow audience.68 The 
theoretical complexity that inheres in federalism and sovereign immu-
nity, the abstruse and coded nature of the rulings assessed, Noonan's 
technical and occasionally elliptical approach to certain matters, and 
the limited effectiveness of his dialogic technique might preclude 
broad dissemination. Many readers without legal training could find 
the book inaccessible, while even attorneys and law students may en-
63 See supra notes 30-32, 58-60 and accompanying text. 
64 See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS 
CONST. LQ. 373 (2002); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725 
(1996); Neal K. Katya! & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE LJ. 1259 (2002). 
65 See Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2001, § 4, at 14. Cf HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SEcURI1Y CoNSTITUTION 
( 1990) (reconceptualizing constitutional power-sharing after Iran-Contra). 
66 See Edward L Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L REv. 711 (2001); see also 
Caminker, supra note 21 (criticizing the Court's power assertion and exploring alternative 
sources of congressional power); Meltzer, supra note 30 (examining alternative courses of 
action for Congress). See generally NAGEL, supra note 33 (exploring the implications of the 
Court's federalism jurisprudence for various areas of American life and law). 
67 See supra notes 64-65. 
68 Linda Greenhouse, Beyond Original Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, § 7, at 8. For 
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counter difficulty following the specific ideas that the writer accords 
laconic treatment. 
These concerns do not undermine Noonan's important contribu-
tions. However, he might have considered a few areas expressly or in 
greater detail, extracted more lessons from the state sovereign immu-
nity decisions, and proffered additional suggestions for rectifying or 
ameliorating the current situation. lt would be valuable to have a 
larger number of and more particularized insights from an observer 
who has so assiduously studied federalism and separated powers. 
Elaboration of his expert views on precisely why the doctrine devel-
oped as it did and on how to realize improvement would be instruc-
tive, especially for those who seek change in the recent case law. The 
above concepts have particular salience when highly controversial, 
strongly held perspectives on superior means of allocating govern-
mental authority suffuse present discourse, and the United States con-
fronts apparently insoluble domestic and world problems. 
C0Nc1.us10N 
Narrowing the Nation's Power substantially enhances appreciation of 
the Court's federalism jurisprudence, demonstrating how the new 
opinions have redistributed power between the states and the national 
government and among the federal legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. Noonan illuminates a novel, critical jurisprudential turn 
and its detrimental impacts, while he provides promising responses to 
these phenomena. 
